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Abstract 
 
 In the decades following World War II, the Louisiana National Guard evolved due to 
world, national, and local events. In response to the United States’ Cold War policies to contain 
Communism, the Guard expanded, professionalized, and was occasionally called to federal 
service. In conjunction with Cold War fears of external attack and internal subversion, a civil 
defense mission brought coordination between federal, state and local response agencies. Despite 
the lack of large scale war service or an attack on the U.S. homeland , the skills and 
responsibilities acquired by the Louisiana Guard during this time period resulted in an enhanced 
ability to respond to Louisiana’s biggest practical threat, i.e. natural disasters. 
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Introduction 
 
On November 11, 1946, in a publicized Armistice Day ceremony at the Municipal 
Auditorium in New Orleans, Major General Raymond H. Fleming accepted the return of the 
regimental colors of the Louisiana National Guard from the U.S. Army1. Most of the state’s 
units, federalized in 1940, had been in training or fighting overseas since 1941.  A return to state 
duty, however, did not mean a return to the pre-war status quo. The end of World War II 
eventually signaled a dramatic expansion of the peacetime U.S. armed forces, including the 
National Guard. Unlike the aftermath of the First World War, U.S. foreign policy did not return 
to non-intervention in European affairs. Although the United States had some involvement in the 
Western Hemisphere and parts of Asia since the late nineteenth century, the level of intervention 
increased as the bi-polar geopolitical nature of the Cold War developed. Immediately after 
victory, it seemed as though a retreat from foreign affairs might again occur as the military 
actually saw a massive demobilization through 1946.  The passage of the National Security Act 
in 1947, combined with reaction to the new Soviet nuclear capability and the rise of Communist 
China in 1949, began a buildup of military resources and direct engagement with the outside 
world.2  While the threat of mutually assured nuclear destruction kept a direct conflict with the 
Soviet Union at bay, ideological and economic competition over the decolonizing Third World 
created occasional regional wars. Domestic civil defense, however, remained a high concern in 
the U.S. as fears of communist expansion and a potential nuclear attack influenced political 
dialogues and citizens’ imaginations.  Despite their combat record from both World Wars, Army 
                                                          
1 Evans J. Casso, Louisiana Legacy: A History of the State National Guard (Gretna: Pelican Publishing Company, 
1976), 183.  
2 Abbott A. Brayton, “American Reserve Policies Since World War II,” Military Affairs Vol. 36, No. 4 (Dec. 1972): 
140. 
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National Guard units were generally placed in a strategic reserve status for most of the Cold 
War. Even so, the Guard’s federal and state roles expanded during the early days of this period. 
The enhanced training, increased funds, and expanded mission of the Louisiana National Guard 
(LANG) during the Cold War were expressed in several ways. While adapting it to national 
needs and mandates, the Louisiana Guard commanders of the early Cold War period, Raymond 
Fleming and Raymond Hufft, shaped the organization for the decades ahead. These two adjutant 
generals alternated tenures four times between 1948 and 1964, coincident with gubernatorial 
elections and the rotation of rival factions in state government. During a period of thirty six 
years, Fleming and Hufft were the only two commanders of the Louisiana National Guard.  
While this thesis primarily focuses on the story of the organization itself, it is important to 
understand these leaders’ personalities and backgrounds as well as the unique succession of 
command that occurred since their impact on the state’s National Guard was so great.  
Ray Fleming commanded a battery of New Orleans’ 141st Field Artillery during World 
War I and was named adjutant general of Louisiana by Governor Huey Long in 1928.3 He 
commanded the Louisiana National Guard through the Great Depression and World War II, 
forging relationships with other states as well as the U.S. Army.4 Fleming emphasized the need 
for manpower procurement policies in the case of national emergency in the late 1930s. His 
efforts influenced selective service reform just prior to the U.S. entry into World War II.5 His 
influence was also a factor in securing central Louisiana as a site for one of the largest training 
                                                          
3 The 141st Field Artillery is commonly known by its more traditional name, the Washington Artillery. With official 
lineage going back to 1838, it is Louisiana’s oldest National Guard unit. 
4 Casso, Legacy, 234. 
5 General Malin Craig letters to Brigadier General Raymond Fleming, 7 March 1938, 9 March 1938, and 6 March 
1939. Folder 20, Box 2, Raymond H. Fleming Collection, Louisiana National Guard (LANG) Archives, New 
Orleans, Louisiana. Craig was U.S. Army Chief of Staff from 1935 to 1939. Also see Fleming speech transcripts 
relating to emergency manpower procurement in the same folder. 
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maneuvers in United States history.6  Fleming’s “resignation” in 1948 was the result of a 
political imbroglio in which he offended Leander Perez, the political boss of Plaquemines Parish 
and power broker within the Louisiana Democratic Party.7 The favored 1948 gubernatorial 
candidate, Earl Long, needed Perez’ support and promised to name someone else Adjutant 
General. Despite resigning as Adjutant General, Fleming retained command of the 39th Infantry 
Division, which LANG reported to at the time.8 In 1950, he was named Chief of the National 
Guard Bureau in Washington, D.C.9 
Upon his inauguration, Governor Earl Long named thirty-three year-old Raymond Hufft 
as adjutant general of Louisiana. Not only was Hufft the most decorated World War II veteran 
from the state, he was politically connected to Leander Perez, Congressman F. Edward Hebert, 
and former Governor Jimmy Noe.10   To date, General Hufft is the youngest officer appointed 
adjutant general in Louisiana. His military career started in 1934 as a private in the Louisiana 
National Guard with the 108th Cavalry Regiment, which was reorganized into the 105th Coastal 
Artillery Battalion in 1940. He commanded a battery of the 105th in the Pacific theater of the war 
before volunteering for the First Special Service Force, a predecessor to today’s Special Forces. 
11 Hufft’s service with the Force essentially launched his career. The unit, which was later known 
                                                          
6 Casso, Legacy, 23. 
7 F. Edward Hebert and John McMillan, “Last of the Titans”: The Life and Times of Congressman F. Edward 
Hebert of Louisiana (Lafayette: University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1976), 265. In 1943, Louisiana Governor 
Sam Jones and Leander Perez faced off in a notorious political fight over the appointment of a Plaquemines Parish 
sheriff. Jones ordered General Fleming to send State Guard troops to enforce his appointment. Fleming complied 
with his boss’ order, gaining the eternal enmity of Perez, who made sure he would not be re-appointed in 1948.     
8 Raymond H. Fleming 201 File, Folder 3, Box 1, Raymond H. Fleming Collection, Louisiana National Guard 
Archives, New Orleans, Louisiana. 
9 Michael D. Doubler, Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636-2000 (Lawrence: Kansas  
University Press, 2003), 403. 
10 Hebert, Last of the Titans, 122-123. 
11 Robert H. Adleman and George Walton, The Devil’s Brigade (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1966), 246. The 
lineage from the First Special Service Force to modern Army Special Forces units is not a direct one because the 
FSSF ceased to exist in1945. In 1960, during a special ceremony at Fort Bragg, the former commander of the First 
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as “The Devil’s Brigade,” specialized in dangerous missions behind enemy lines. Using his 
irregular training, Hufft led a reconnaissance mission over the Rhine the night before the Allied 
armies crossed into Germany. He was seriously wounded in the ensuing battle and finished his 
war service in a military hospital.12 When Hufft’s Guard unit was federalized in 1940, he was a 
first lieutenant. He returned to Louisiana a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army in 1945. His 
awards included the Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star, the Bronze Star, and the Purple 
Heart, among many others.13 While Hufft’s relation to influential politicians likely helped his 
appointment from Long, the officer clearly had combat credentials and command experience. He 
served as the adjutant general for Earl Long from 1948 to 1952 and then again from 1956 to 
1960. In the years 1952 to 1956, anti-Long reformer Robert Kennon served as governor and 
brought back Fleming, who had retired from his federal position in D.C.  Kennon served as an 
officer under Fleming prior to World War II.14 In 1960, Fleming was again appointed by 
Governor Jimmie Davis.15  
Fleming was an able administrator who had considerable experience and national 
influence. He had strong ties to the National Guard Bureau in Washington D.C. and was 
preferred by many of the older officers in the Louisiana National Guard. Meanwhile, Ray Hufft 
was a “maverick”, a strong personality who commanded with a wink and a smile, effective and 
                                                          
Special Service Force, Major General (Retired) Robert Frederick, presented the colors of the unit to Colonel 
Edwards, commanding officer of the 7th Special Forces Group.  
12 George A. Fisher, The Story of the 180th Infantry Regiment (Oklahoma City: George A. Fisher, 1947). A self-
published memoir with no page numbers, this was written by a soldier of the 180th Infantry. Raymond Hufft was 
commanding a battalion of the 180th when he was wounded after crossing the Rhine. Fisher offers a first-hand 
account toward the end of the work. 
13 Casso, Legacy, 236-240. 
14 Francis C. Grevemberg, My Wars: Nazis, Mobsters, Gambling, and Corruption (Lafayette: Beau   
Bayou Publishing Company, 2004), 63-66. 
15Casso, Legacy, 235 
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inspiring to younger soldiers. The combination of Fleming’s administrative acumen and Hufft’s 
charisma ultimately proved effective for the organization during the period discussed.16  
 
  
Major General Ray Fleming 1950, left. Major General Ray Hufft 1959, right. Photos 
courtesy Louisiana National Guard (LANG) Archives. 
 
It was a transitional period for the Louisiana Army Guard. Its traditional roles connected 
to the US military and the state were redefined and, in some cases, evolved during the time 
period discussed. This is reflected in the areas of federal military involvement, domestic civil 
defense, and emergency response. The federal government occasionally called up Guard units to 
federal duty, but overseas activity was not common. The adjutant generals were also made 
directors of Louisiana’s Selective Service system, which affected the relationship between the 
                                                          
16 Ibid, 233-240 
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Guard and the regular Army in terms of manpower management.17 The Louisiana Army National 
Guard’s further involvement in federal Cold War issues included the organization of specialized 
warfare units and international refugee aid. Civil defense support was an almost entirely new role 
for the organization. This mission resided in an ill-defined area between federal and state duty. It 
involved training for the possibility of a conventional or nuclear attack on the homeland and 
working with civilian agencies and organizations in this regard. Emergency response was 
another traditional role that evolved between 1946 and 1965. A series of hurricanes, floods, and 
industrial accidents created a higher need for response capability. Expanded funding, more 
advanced equipment, and the training provided for war and civil defense resulted in a larger 
emergency related role that culminated with the Hurricane Betsy response in 1965.  Ultimately, 
Major Generals Fleming and Hufft used national Cold War defense policy, the increased funding 
it brought, and civil defense resources to shape the Louisiana National Guard into an 
organization that could respond much more effectively to the frequent natural and man-made 
disasters that Louisiana would face. 
The historiography of this period in Louisiana Army National Guard history is limited. 
Earlier treatments of Cold War developments were written for the National Guard as a whole, 
such as The Minute Man in Peace and War by Jim Dan Hill and John K. Mahon’s History of the 
Militia and National Guard.18 Hill wrote as a former Guardsmen and showed clear bias toward 
the National Guard system, often in almost emotional terms. Mahon’s book is much more 
objective and quite useful as a general National Guard history. More recently, multiple works by 
                                                          
17 Casso, Legacy, 233-234 
18Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard (Harrisburg, PA: The 
Stackpole Company, 1964). John K Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing, 1983).  
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Michael D. Doubler offer an extensive survey of state militia and National Guard History. His 
writing, such as Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, also cover the Guard as a whole in a scholarly 
way.19 While Mahon and Doubler provide a substantive overview, they are general treatments, 
using occasional examples from specific state National Guard units but never providing a full 
case study or spending much time on any one state or on one era.  
In the 1970s, Evans J. Casso wrote Louisiana Legacy: A History of the State National 
Guard, which relates Louisiana’s militia and Guard history up through World War II.20 Two 
chapters go beyond that, but they mostly consist of opinion and speculation on the future. Casso 
had access to the Louisiana National Guard archives, then referred to as the Adjutant General’s 
Office library. The book is a good survey of Louisiana military history from the standpoint of the 
militia and National Guard, but was written for a popular audience and was apparently at one 
time used by some of the state’s high schools in their civics curriculum.21 As with other sources 
noted, Casso focuses almost entirely on the federal military role of the Guard. None of the afore-
mentioned books cover much ground in relation to the National Guard’s role in civil defense or 
disaster response. There are some contemporaneous journal articles about civil defense, but they 
tend to focus on political theory rather than the activities and preparations of the military and 
government agencies. While at least one journal article recognizes the changing role of the 
Guard regarding disaster response, most articles and books concerning natural disasters in the 
1940s-1960s view them through a social, cultural, and/or political lens, but not many focus on 
the first responders themselves.22 An understanding of the development of the Louisiana 
                                                          
19 Doubler, Civilian in Peace. 
20 Casso, Legacy. 
21 Multiple officers in the Louisiana National Guard, as of this writing, have mentioned this to the author. 
22 Philip H. Burch, Jr. and Bennett M. Rich, “The Changing Role of the National Guard,” The American Political 
Science Review Vol. 50, No. 3 (September 1956): 702-706. This article directly, but briefly, talks about the Guard’s 
growing disaster response responsibilities. For a good example of a social/political article examining disasters in the 
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National Guard in the second half of the twentieth century would not be complete without 
including the evolution of domestic capabilities, responsibilities, and missions. Flood and 
hurricane duty preceded World War II, but disaster relief responsibilities of the Louisiana Guard 
expanded during the Cold War period, typically in conjunction with the civil defense role. 
Hurricanes Flossie, Audrey, Hilda, and Betsy occurred in this era, as did a major levee break at 
Port Allen, Louisiana and several industrial disasters. This paper will use a combination of some 
of the above sources, other secondary sources, contemporaneous newspaper articles, primary 
source documents from the Louisiana National Guard Archives, and archival papers that 
prominent Louisiana Guardsmen have left with area university collections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
period, see Andy Horowitz, “Hurricane Betsy and the Politics of Disaster in New Orleans’ Lower Ninth Ward, 
1965-1967,” The Journal of Southern History Vol. 80, No. 4 (November 2014): 893-934. 
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Chapter 1: Federal Mobilization and Training 
The Louisiana Army National Guard’s role within the U.S. Army shifted after World 
War II. There was significant debate inside the military over the organization and use of the 
National Guard.  The Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations all viewed the National 
Guard as an important component, but there was some debate within the military about 
abandoning the state based system in favor of a singular federal militia. There were also calls for 
universal military training for males. Ultimately, key military leaders favored the American 
tradition of the volunteer “citizen soldier” while state politicians and members of Congress did 
not want to lose favor with constituents back home.23  Louisiana retained its state military 
apparatus, but exactly how the dual federal/state role would play out as part of a superpower’s 
military was still unclear.  
The most direct contribution of the Louisiana Army National Guard to the Cold War was 
through limited federal mobilizations. In both World Wars, the Guard was fully mobilized until 
the conflict was over and won. In the new global paradigm, “hot” conflicts would be limited, 
both in scope and expected outcomes. The first federal mobilization came with the Korean War. 
In September of 1950, Louisiana’s 773rd Tank Battalion was called up to replenish the regular 
Army’s strategic reserve in the continental United States at Fort Polk and, later, Fort Benning. 
The unit remained activated until November of 1954.24 The military initiated an individual 
rotation policy geared toward a reliance on draftees, sending soldiers into one year commitments 
in Korea with no regard for continuity in Guard unit personnel. Despite the 773rd’s support 
                                                          
23 Doubler, Civilian in Peace, 219-225. 
24 773rd Tank Battalion 1946-196 folders, Vertical File, LANG Archives. The unit remained active for that whole 
period, but the individual men who were initially mobilized with the unit were not. Typical service for an individual 
soldier was for a year. 
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mission within the continental United States, most individuals from the tank unit departed for 
overseas service in Korea.25 As Chief of the National Guard Bureau in Washington, Fleming had 
to calm down fears of Guardsmen being unready for combat. He assured that they would receive 
proper training prior to deployment. This was indeed the case, as Guardsmen did require a period 
of combat training before departing for Korea.26  
Issues arose surrounding personnel continuity within the activated National Guard units. 
As Louisiana personnel were levied to regular units in Europe or Korea, U.S. Army replacements 
filled the 773rd. By the third year of federal service, the unit no longer retained any of its original 
Louisiana members. Guardsmen returning home after a tour of duty had no home unit to return 
to because theirs was still active in federal service. This issue showed the lack of coordination 
and communication between “Big Army” and the National Guard. In an attempt to help maintain 
unit lineage so prized by state militias, the National Guard Bureau created a “mirror unit” with a 
smaller authorized personnel strength back in Louisiana, called the 773rd Tank Battalion 
(NGUS).27 Units of the NGUS (National Guard-United States) were created as an ad hoc 
solution to the problem.  After the unit on federal mobilization was redeployed to its state and 
returned to the command of the governor, it was officially merged with the NGUS “mirror unit.”  
The Truman Administration’s rotation policy and creation of temporary NGUS units was very 
unpopular with National Guard leadership and supporters because they believed it threatened the 
unit integrity inherent in the Guard.28   Guard supporters felt it slighted the nation’s oldest 
                                                          
25 “773rd Tank Battalion,” Louisiana National Guard pamphlet, 1955, LANG Archives, New Orleans. Also see 
Curney J. Dronet, A Perspective View – The Louisiana Brigade: The Evolvement of the 256thMechanized Infantry 
Brigade (Separate), 1770-2004 (Sulphur, LA: Wise Printing, 2005), 39-40. 
26 Times Picayune clipping, 1950, Specific date clipped out, National Guard Publicity scrapbook 1950, 170, LANG 
Archives. 
27 “773rd Tank Battalion” pamphlet 
28 Doubler, Civilian in Peace, 231-235, also see Mahon, History of Militia, 208-212. 
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military traditions while Guard detractors felt it illustrated the antiquated notions of a state 
militia. 29 General Hufft was firmly in the camp of the former. He was not afraid to publicly 
criticize President Truman’s policies on this, or any number of issues. By the time Fleming 
returned to the Louisiana adjutant general position in 1953, the Korean War was winding down 
and the Army was no longer calling up guardsmen. He was, however, the Chief of the National 
Guard Bureau from 1950-1953, a position which gave him some influence within the U.S. 
military. He was also powerful within the National Guard Association of the United States 
(NGAUS), called by some the “Guard lobby,” as a former president of the organization.30 Both 
critics and supporters of the National Guard admit that the NGAUS was typically successful in 
currying favor with the U.S. Congress.31  
 
                                                          
29 Doubler, Civilian in Peace, 231-235. 
30 The National Guardsman, Feb. 1948, 12. 
31 Martha Derthick, The National Guard in Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 119-122. 
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773rd Tank Battalion, circa 1950s. Courtesy Louisiana National Guard Archives 
 
In 1952 and 1955, Congress passed two Armed Forces Reserve Acts that laid out more 
clearly the responsibilities, regulation, and composition of military reserve forces. The National 
Guard was generally placed in a higher position than the U.S. Army Reserve, although the 
Reserves made gains as well. Eisenhower’s “New Look” emphasized the possibility of nuclear 
warfare, which put the reserve components into a more prominent role.32 Congress amended 
Title 10 and Title 32 of the U.S. Code, which more clearly delineated the National Guard’s state 
obligations versus national obligations and service for future actions.33 
                                                          
32 William F. Levantrosser, Congress and the Citizen Soldier (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967), 63-69. 
33 Doubler, Civilian in Peace, 238-239. Title 10 outlines the role of the United States Armed Forces. It regulates 
federal mobilization of National Guard personnel under the command of the President of the United States. Title 32 
more specifically outlines National Guard issues, focusing on domestic activation under the command of a state 
governor.  
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The next major federal mobilization came under the Kennedy Administration. During the 
Eisenhower years, the military had been reorganized to react to a nuclear conflict. After Kennedy 
came into office in 1961, he moved toward a strategy of “flexible response,” one capable of 
handling a range of different contingencies, from nuclear warfare to small guerilla operations.34 
The Berlin Crisis of 1961 was an event that occurred during the formulation of this new strategy. 
Perhaps hoping to intimidate the young President into submission, Russian Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev renewed his demand that U.S. forces withdraw from West Berlin. Kennedy’s 
response was to prepare for confrontation.35 He put the military on alert, increased defense 
expenditures, and requested permission from Congress to mobilize the National Guard and the 
Reserves. On July 31, Congress passed a joint resolution that authorized mobilization of up to 
250,000 Guardsmen and reservists for a year.  
The resulting activation was not without complications for the Guard. Many of the 
manpower and training issues from the Korean conflict reappeared. The overall National Guard 
response was uneven. Some units were ready within three months while others were not fully 
prepared by the demobilization almost a year later. 36 Some Guard critics argue that the 
mobilization of the Guard and Reserves was simply a political tool by Kennedy to symbolize 
resolve and support from the nation by using its “citizen soldiers.”37 This partial mobilization of 
Guardsmen as a tool of foreign policy was unpopular among some of the personnel activated 
because it demanded a year of service for what some felt amounted to political showmanship.38  
                                                          
34 George Fielding Eliot, Reserve Forces and the Kennedy Strategy (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1962) 1-
2. 
35 Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 199. 
36 Doubler, Civilian in Peace, 251. 
37 Martin Binkin, U.S. Reserve Forces: The Problem of the Weekend Warriors (Washington D.C.: The Brooking 
Institution, 1974), 20.  
38 Mahon, History of the Militia, 228-230. 
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Louisiana’s representing units were generally well prepared. The LANG command staff 
took the position that it showed Louisiana’s readiness and willingness to engage the communist 
threat. Louisiana Army National Guard units federalized included the 159th Evacuation Hospital, 
the 3628th Ordnance Company and the 204th Transportation Group at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The 
415th Ordnance Company was sent to Fort Campbell, Kentucky while Baton Rouge’s 769th 
Signal Battalion maintained strategic readiness at Fort Polk, Louisiana.39 The result of this 
international incident was the construction of the Berlin Wall, but neither side was compelled to 
engage in armed conflict. Diplomatic advances, combined with military backup, maintained a 
status quo, although Khrushchev was able to stem the tide of refugees fleeing Communist East 
Berlin.40  
For the Louisiana Guard, however, it signified that enhanced training over the previous 
decade created a force prepared for an almost immediate activation.41 The 159th Evacuation 
Hospital and the 204th Transportation Group received a “Superior” rating on the Strategic Army 
Command Readiness Test. Major General Samuel T. Williams of the 4th Army Field Training 
Inspection Board sent 204th commander Colonel Francis Grevemberg a letter commending the 
unit’s performance.42 The 769th Signal Battalion was recognized for its performance in a large 
Army exercise designated “Iron Dragon” and won the award for “Most Outstanding” non-
divisional unit in training at Fort Polk during its time federalized.43 Unlike the complication-
plagued activation of the 773rd Tank Battalion for the Korean War, these units had a much 
                                                          
39 Casso, Legacy, 191-192. 
40 Jussi M. Hanhimaki and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Account. 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 328-331. 
41 “Berlin Crisis, LANG 1946-1969” Vertical Files, LANG Archives. 
42Major General Samuel T. Williams to Colonel Francis C. Grevemberg, August-September folder, Box 211-4, 
Francis C. Grevemberg Collection, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, Louisiana. 
43 State of Louisiana Adjutant General’s Office press release, 2 August 1962, Louisiana National Guard Press 
release collection, LANG Archives  
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smoother and more successful mobilization. Since no combat resulted, the regular Army had no 
opportunity to levy individuals from the units. Therefore, unit personnel cohesion remained. 
Also, based on the ratings given by Army commanders, the Louisiana units seemed to be well 
prepared for this strategic reserve duty relative to many other Army Guard units.  
Increasingly integrated combat training was another aspect of the Guard’s military 
evolution during the Cold War. In the years 1949-1951, the 39th Infantry Division, consisting of 
the Louisiana and Arkansas National Guard, trained together in massive maneuvers, usually 
around Fort Polk, Louisiana. During this time, Major General Fleming was in command of the 
39th Division while Brigadier General Hufft commanded the Louisiana National Guard.44 The 
two Louisiana generals were able to work together for the betterment of the organization, despite 
their differences in age, political affiliations, and temperament. The encampment combined 
infantry, artillery, armor, various support functions, and even air power into a massive joint 
operation. “The single objective of this stepped up training program is to crowd as much military 
training as possible into as little time as possible without interfering with the jobs or studies of 
Louisiana’s Guardsmen.”45  It is a reminder that for most of their time, these soldiers and airmen 
were citizens who maintained normal jobs or went to school with other civilians.  
In addition to the military training, Hufft wanted to provide some morale to the annual 
commitment. In 1949 and following years, he had Lieutenant Harold “Hoss” Memtsas, head 
football coach at Warren Easton High School and former Tulane University football star, run an 
                                                          
44 State of Louisiana Adjutant General’s Office press release, 1 July 1949, LANG Archives. 
45 State of Louisiana Adjutant General’s Office press release, 17 January 1951, LANG Archives 
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athletics program. After the battle simulations, soldiers were given the opportunity to play 
basketball, softball, and volleyball as well as participate in swimming and boxing competitions.46  
Several advances in training at the national level would have improved the overall 
readiness of the Guard for federal mobilization as well as domestic activations. Authorized 
strength for the National Guard increased in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It is likely Hufft was 
using the highly publicized Louisiana training events as a recruitment tool. During the Korean 
War, in particular, these activities might have attracted young men to the Guard as an alternative 
to being drafted into the regular Army. In 1947, the personnel strength of the Louisiana National 
Guard was 3,636 officers and enlisted men. By 1955, it was up to 9,796. After 1955, it decreased 
slightly and fluctuated between 7,000 and 8,500 up to 1965.47  
The 1955 Reserve Forces Act indicated a need for stronger, more ready reserves. The US 
Army had to ensure viable units in case they were called up for active duty. One major policy 
shift was that all Guard recruits had to go through a standard six month basic training, conducted 
by “Big Army.” The National Guard Association protested in Congress on the basis that this 
policy would hurt recruiting efforts and cause issues with employers. Recruiting did take a slight 
and temporary hit. An unintended benefit, however, is that the National Guard was freed from all 
individual basic training obligations. This allowed states to focus on unit development and 
training for domestic activation scenarios in addition to typical drill and annual exercises. 
Concurrently, states created or improved on their own Officer Candidate Schools. Many states, 
including Louisiana, eventually instituted Non Commissioned Officer training schools as well. 
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The maintenance of an internal state training for officers and NCOs provided dedicated and 
continuous leadership.48  
Monthly drill policies were improved. Prior to changes in the mid-fifties, drills were two 
hours a week, forty eight times a year, and capped with a two week annual training program. Not 
a great deal could be accomplished within these short weekly drill periods. This changed to one 
weekend a month with longer sessions. Longer drill periods, while not necessarily changing the 
quantity of training hours, provided an opportunity for higher quality and productivity in training 
and drills.  Furthermore, the Army authorized additional drills to enhance more specialized 
training. Brigadier General (Retired) Curney J. Dronet, a lifelong Guardsman, mentioned in his 
history of the Louisiana infantry that these factors progressively improved state Guard training 
from the mid-nineteen fifties into the sixties.49   
Unit diversity, with accompanying military occupation specialties, was allowed to 
expand. Prior to World War II, Guard units were generally tied to traditional infantry roles, 
including artillery and cavalry. After World War II, the Army’s technological advancement and 
increasingly diverse needs required more of its reserves. The 1950s saw a proliferation of anti-
aircraft units, probably connected to the Guard’s civil defense role. More lasting types of units 
that were formed or expanded in the Louisiana Guard included medical, transportation, aviation, 
and engineering.  
A good example of unit specialization is the LANG Special Forces. Unhappy with the 
Eisenhower administration’s emphasis on nuclear warfare, the Command and General Staff 
College drafted a strategy for combatting Communist insurgencies. Using both military and 
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political capabilities, small units would be trained in guerrilla warfare, counter insurgency 
techniques, civil disturbances, counterintelligence, psychological warfare, and civil affairs 
assistance. Senator John F. Kennedy, a presidential candidate at the time and a member of the 
Senate Foreign Relations committee, supported special operations as part of a more diverse 
strategy that would eventually evolve into his future administration’s “flexible response” 
stance.50  
Louisiana was one of five states to organize Special Forces units in their Army National 
Guard as part of a larger Special Operations force that expanded further when Kennedy became 
president.51  Beginning in 1959, the unit went through a few re-designations before being known 
as Company D, 20th Special Forces Group. The unit had three detachments, one each at New 
Orleans, Baton Rouge and Breaux Bridge.  
Hufft’s prior service with the First Special Service Force and continued affiliation with 
some of the policy proponents in Washington may have put Louisiana on the short list. Some 
soldiers from the unit say he was personally acquainted with Kennedy.52  Hufft was directly 
involved in the recruiting and organization of this specialized outfit. He probably stationed the 
third detachment in Breaux Bridge, a small Cajun hamlet, because his good friend Lieutenant 
Colonel Patin was a native there. Patin, who commanded the Breaux Bridge unit, had been an 
airborne soldier during World War II who had become close with Hufft. Lieutenant Colonel John 
Boh, another airborne veteran and Office of Strategic Services member now in the Louisiana 
Guard, also helped General Hufft recruit officers and enlisted men. Prior to the unit’s first 
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qualifying jump at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Hufft had custom jump boots made for the men 
and made sure he was the first one off the plane in the ensuing training exercise. This sort of 
bravado is what made many look up to Hufft while it turned others off.53 
Courtesy Louisiana National Guard Archives 
Earlier training missions had the unit jumping in Louisiana and training in the Deep 
South states of Florida, Georgia, and Alabama. Tensions heated up in Latin America as a result 
of Fidel Castro’s takeover of Cuba and the Special Forces units received more attention. The 
Kennedy Administration’s entry into the Vietnam conflict also beefed up Special Forces training. 
Rather than the woods of Alabama or Louisiana, Company D began training in the jungles of 
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Panama and Puerto Rico. President Johnson’s escalation put the unit on alert for a deployment to 
Southeast Asia. Policy shifted in 1968, however, putting the brakes on such a mobilization. 
Several members of Company D voluntarily transferred to the regular Army for Vietnam service, 
some paying the ultimate price.54  
While active federal involvement for the Louisiana National Guard was limited during 
the years 1946-1965, development during that time was critical.  Readiness capabilities appeared 
to improve over the decade from the Korean War to Kennedy’s Berlin Crisis. Reforms at the 
federal level did not necessarily create more training hours but effected a more efficient use of 
drill. Hufft, in particular, sought to maximize unit training within whatever small windows were 
available. Six month Army basic training for individual recruits enhanced readiness, while 
allowing the Guard to maximize annual training and monthly drill for unit development and 
inter-operability within the LANG itself. While personnel strength fluctuated, the size of the 
LANG remained much higher than it was prior to or immediately after World War II.  More 
bodies were available for federal mobilization or domestic activation. Unit specialization showed 
an increase in professionalism and training beyond the traditional infantry role. Louisiana’s 
Congressional delegation was often fighting for its Guard as well. Powerful Congressmen 
Overton Brooks and F. Edward Herbert, in particular, were almost always in support of the 
“Guard lobby.”55 Political competition between certain factions supporting “Big Army” and 
those supporting the National Guard in some ways created a more professional force. Winston 
Wilson, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, said that the National Guard had moved from being 
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“near professional” in the recent past toward being “the full professional” organization by 
1963.56 
The Cold War may not have required most Louisiana Guardsmen to enter a “hot 
conflict,” but these developments directly and indirectly benefited the organization in its 
domestic roles. Quicker reaction times, integrated training of different types of units, unit 
diversification, and better individual training could only enhance the Guard’s roles in civil 
defense and emergency response.  
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Chapter 2: Civil Defense 
  While the mission as a reserve force for the U.S. Armed Forces has always been the 
tradition of the Guard and the state militias that preceded it, domestic civil defense against 
potential foreign enemy action was something not seen since the War of 1812. Civil defense 
during the Cold War entailed defending the homeland from a potential Soviet attack. The 
assumption was that the U.S. Army would be either crippled or otherwise occupied in foreign 
territory to deal with the aftermath of an attack on the continental U.S. Domestic forces would be 
necessary to deal with the situation. 57 The National Guard was an ideal choice but the primary 
role of the organization was to act as a reserve for the regular military branches. Therefore, it 
was possible that the Guard would also be unavailable to defend local populace from bombings 
and/or deal with the after effects of a nuclear attack. Efforts in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
were to enlist the general public as civil defenders.58  
American culture was in the midst of a “Red Scare.” The public underwent air raid drills 
and schoolchildren were trained to “duck and cover” under their desks when the alarms sirens 
wailed.59 The notion of every citizen being responsible for civil defense was partially tied into 
cultural concerns over the “nuclear family” and maintaining gender roles in the post-war, non-
communist world.  Practical policies regarding the military defense of the United States were 
culturally connected to fears of internal subversion by left wing forces.60  Pro-American 
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sentiment became synonymous with anti-communism.61 This manifested in ways that could be 
seen as positive as well as negative. Ray Hufft was a classic “Cold Warrior” and typified the 
conservative American ideal during the time period. On one hand, he provided temporary 
housing for refugees from the Soviet crackdown on Hungary in 1956.62 On the other hand, his 
incendiary Memorial Day speech about the United Kingdom’s trade policies with Communist 
China provoked protest from the British Consul in New Orleans.63 Ray Fleming took a more 
moderate tone. For example, in 1954 he joined local officials at a dinner honoring Ethiopian 
leader, Haile Selassie.64 A proponent of the non-alignment movement of third world nations and 
the savior of the Rastafarian religion, Selassie was not communist but tended to irk the more 
conservative elements in the U.S. It is doubtful that Hufft would have been at that dinner were he 
the adjutant general in 1954. As a combination of viable homeland defense strategy and a 
reflection of the anti-communist cultural trend of the period, Fleming and Hufft were heavily 
involved with civil defense efforts in Louisiana.  
The idea of a state level civil defense agency predated the Cold War. Fleming directed 
preparation for a plan prior to World War II under the administration of Governor Sam Jones.65 
It was years, however, before formal organizing began. Named by Earl Long as Louisiana’s 
Civil Defense Director in 1950, Hufft set out to establish more permanent civil defense plans. 
After attending conferences with federal officials and members of the National Guard 
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Association in Washington, Hufft went on a public relations blitz in Louisiana that combined 
genuine attempts to create a sense of civic duty with outright “red baiting.” He stressed that the 
civil defense plans were for war only, and that they would not be concerned with disaster relief. 
He also expressed a concern of subversive infiltration, “We certainly don’t want communists and 
other traitors to be in a position to sabotage the civil defense functions in some future 
emergency.”66 Hufft spoke to several organizations, including the Rotary Clubs of Alexandria 
and New Orleans and veterans groups statewide, concerning the evils of communism and leftists. 
He promised that civil defense outlets will be screened at the local and state level “to prevent the 
infiltration of communists into this extremely important organization.”67 Hufft urged the state’s 
residents to participate in civil defense programs such as the Ground Observers’ Corps and 
volunteer “ham” radio warning networks.68    
President Truman created The Federal Civil Defense Administration by Executive Order 
10186 in 1950. The Louisiana Civil Defense Agency was established by the state legislature the 
same year. Between 1950 and 1952, most of the state agency’s efforts under Hufft were directed 
at public awareness of the importance of civil defense. It was not until after Fleming’s return to 
Louisiana in late 1952, however, that the Agency was fully active as an organization. According 
to the 1952-1953 biennial report, “The primary mission of the Louisiana Civil Defense Agency 
is to minimize the effects of enemy action upon the civilian population and to thus enable a 
continuation of the war effort.”69 It goes on to outline the responsibilities, including education, 
communications with the federal and local levels, and the establishment of an adequate 
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organization to control and direct all resources of the state, parishes, and municipalities to cope 
with emergency conditions that may result from enemy action. This 1952-1953 report briefly 
mentions that disaster response was a secondary mission.70 Despite the existence of the Federal 
Civil Defense Agency, state, local, and private efforts remained at the forefront since federal 
programs for things such as evacuation and shelter administration were impractical and deemed 
inefficient.71 
The National Guard was closely connected to the state’s civil defense program and the 
adjutant general of Louisiana selected the director. Fleming named one of his assistant adjutant 
generals, Brigadier General Francis Woolfley to the post. Woolfley was a highly respected 
veteran of World War I who served a successful active duty career before joining the Guard, 
including time as the chief of staff for U.S. Army forces in Turkey.72 Other prominent 
Guardsmen who became planners, coordinators, and directors in the Louisiana Civil Defense 
Agency were Colonel Frank Spiess, Colonel Anees Mogabgab, Colonel John Boh, and Colonel 
Numa Avendano.73 Colonel Francis Grevemberg, commander of the 204th Anti-Aircraft Group 
and 204th Transportation Group, was the head of the Louisiana State Police, which was also 
closely coordinated with the Civil Defense Agency. While all these men had proven able in the 
field of battle or as effective organizers and administrators in the military, their appointment 
undermined the idea of civilian control of civil defense. Indeed, as the decade wore on, the 
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National Guard’s role in civil defense seemed to grow as the reliance on civilians faded.  After 
the Korean War wound down and there were no enemy attacks on U.S. soil, Louisiana’s civilian 
population became less concerned about nuclear holocaust or an impending Russian attack. 
Local author Mary Lou Widmer writes that New Orleanians, in particular, went on with their 
lives and “forgot about not being able to build bomb shelters, and then concentrated instead on 
building barbecue pits.”74 Despite media and government hype, the Louisiana public seemed to 
become apathetic about civil defense.75 Between the carnival of New Orleans culture, the 
booming post-war economy, and the “Sportsman’s Paradise” provided by the rest of the state, 
there was likely too much else to focus on than a Soviet nuclear threat. 
By the mid-1950s, the Louisiana Civil Defense Agency and the Louisiana National 
Guard seemed to merge their missions.  In 1952, the Louisiana National Guard opened 
enlistment of anti-aircraft units to men over 35. Colonel Grevemberg’s 204th Anti-Aircraft Group 
expanded. Its three anti-aircraft battalions were given increased responsibility. They cooperated 
with regular Army units as part of the country’s master defense plan in case of a conventional 
attack by the USSR or other aggressors. The raising of age limits allowed soldiers with 
experience to fill out the enhanced units.76 No longer were the civilian Ground Observers Corps 
as integral to the nation’s air defenses as military functions picked up. 
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Another event that heralded the National Guard’s enhanced civil defense role was 
“Operation Minuteman” in 1955. This was a surprise nationwide test mobilization for the 
National Guard. It was an experiment ordered by the Pentagon to test the domestic readiness of 
state Guard units to mobilize domestically in the event of a nuclear attack on U.S. soil. Out of the 
9,773 Guardsmen in Louisiana, 8,380 of them, or 86% of the state’s forces reported to their 
armory within a couple of hours. Bogalusa’s 105th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion had 96% 
personnel quickly show up for the surprise mobilization, one of the best performances in the 
nation. The overall national percentage was about 67%. General Fleming directed the operation 
in Louisiana by contacting unit commanders via short wave radio. Individual Guardsmen were, 
in turn, notified by telephone and by local media cooperation.77 Similar to the traditional military 
role, the Louisiana Guard’s domestic activation performance seemingly improved over the 
decade due to training and effective leadership. At least part of this came from the increased 
militarization of civil defense due to lack of public volunteerism as well as the close ties between 
the Louisiana Civil Defense Agency and the Louisiana National Guard. 
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Louisiana’s 935th Field Artillery Battalion, circa 1950s. Courtesy Louisiana National 
 Guard Archives. 
This trend was further reflected at a national level when President Eisenhower merged 
the Federal Civil Defense Administration with other agencies to form the Office of Civil and 
Defense Mobilization (OCDM). This agency had more of a military presence than Truman’s 
FCDA. Public interest in civil defense waned through the late fifties and early sixties, with a 
brief surge during and immediately after the Cuban Missile Crisis.78 President Kennedy 
transferred civil defense responsibilities to the Defense Department and OCDM was renamed the 
Office of Emergency Planning (OEP).79 In 1964, the Pentagon officially connected the federal 
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mission of civil defense to the National Guard and specifically named disaster relief one of the 
functions of this role.80  
Reports of the Louisiana Civil Defense Agency in the late 1950s into the 1960s show that 
it progressively moved away from an active response role and a recruiter of patriotic civilians 
toward more of a coordinating agency, facilitating communications between the Louisiana 
National Guard, other state first response agencies, the Red Cross, and, if necessary, the federal 
government and active military. The Agency also gravitated toward a funding role, managing 
federal grants to public facilities damaged in disasters.81  While mobilization in the face of an 
enemy attack was named as the primary reason for civil defense plans and agencies in the period, 
civil defense and disaster response can be seen to merge as the Cold War progressed. Increased 
federal funding from the federal civil defense agencies, combined with the Louisiana state 
government’s efforts to coordinate various agencies for emergency response, proved useful to a 
state with a propensity for disaster. Despite earlier attempts to separate these two functions, 
Mother Nature and industrial accidents seemed to pose a greater threat to Louisiana citizens than 
the communists could.  In 1966, a U.S. Army officer affiliated with national civil defense 
summarized it best by stating, “Our main effort is designed to help state and local government 
achieve a level of competence to survive enemy attack. If we accomplish this, we also attain a 
highly respectable and effective capability to cope with a natural disaster.”82   
 
 
                                                          
80 Annual Report of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, Fiscal Year 1964, Washington DC. 
81 Biennial Reports, 1952-1953, 1954-1955, 1956-1957, 1958-1959, 1960-1961, 1962-1963, Adjutant Generals 
Reports, LANG archives. 
82 “Anti-Hurricane Plans Told,” Times Picayune April 27, 1966. 
 30 
 
Chapter 3: Emergency Response 
The 1958 report of the Louisiana Civil Defense Agency shows a marked shift from a 
concern over enemy attack to one of dealing with natural and man-made disasters.  While 
sections still existed referring to plans in case of nuclear or conventional offensives by another 
nation, one of the longer sections describes the agency’s new “Natural Disaster Relief Plan” and 
its longest entry in the Operations Section is about the state response to Hurricane Audrey.83 As 
the Louisiana National Guard became a more important factor in civil defense readiness and 
improved its effectiveness regarding military efficiency and coordination, the afterthought of 
emergency response moved more and more to the heart of the organization’s mission.  
Even as hurricanes and floods began to replace Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile 
systems as the major threat to the state’s citizenry, emergency response was not a new role for 
the Guard. As early as 1890, Louisiana governors had been activating the state militia for 
hurricanes and floods.84  The Great Flood of 1927 was the pinnacle of Guard response efforts 
prior to the Cold War. Fleming commanded the 141st Field Artillery (Washington Artillery) 
during the Great Flood. His field report to then Adjutant General Louis Toombs typifies the 
Guard response at that time. It included patrols to ensure that no one sabotaged the levee 
upstream from their own residence, rescue of stranded civilians, evacuation support and refugee 
support. In today’s lexicon, “refugee support” would equate to delivery of food, water, and other 
commodities to evacuee shelters and individuals, i.e. “commodity distribution.” The Guard also 
assisted the Red Cross in organizing and administering the refugee shelters.85  This went far 
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beyond previous emergency responsibilities. Given the resources and technology of the time, 
guardsmen were extremely active during that event. Despite the impressive effort in 1927, 
though, the lack of post-World War II technology, travel infrastructure, and federal funding 
limited the possibilities of response. The 1930s and early 1940s saw some emergency response 
efforts, but nothing on the level of the 1927 flood.86  
After World War II, the Army National Guard was given surplus Army vehicles and 
equipment, including high water trucks, jeeps, and the amphibious DUKWs, pronounced 
“ducks.”87 Beyond that, they also worked with the Louisiana Air National Guard for aerial 
survey and eventually built up an inventory of helicopters. Higher national training standards 
required for a potential World War III scenario made the Guard units quicker to respond, and 
gave them practice working together. Civil defense initiatives connected Guard leadership to 
other state and federal agencies and resources. This situation also gave the Guardsmen some 
training with perspective to such things such as damaged infrastructure, looting, maintaining 
effective communications, search and rescue, and other symptoms of social/political breakdown 
that might result from a nuclear attack. As natural or man-made disasters took the place of 
nuclear war fears, the National Guard, along with other agencies and organizations, became more 
practiced in response initiatives. Even some of the critics of the National Guard system admit 
that the organization saw an increase in domestic responsibilities into and through the 1960s.88  
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The period also a saw a progressive increase in the size of engineer units within the 
Louisiana National Guard. The 225th Engineer Aviation Battalion was formed in 1954 in the 
Louisiana Air National Guard but was quickly re-allotted to the Army Guard. Headquartered at 
Jackson Barracks, the engineers’ role in disaster response grew with each disaster. In 1963, it 
was expanded to the 225th Engineer Group, consisting of multiple battalions.89 Cranes, dump 
trucks, bulldozers and other equipment were added to the Guard’s arsenal. While engineer units 
certainly had value in a combat setting, they also had obvious advantages for disaster response, 
including infrastructure repair, road clearing, communications support, transportation, and other 
missions. 
A clear line of positive development in emergency response can be seen from 1946 
through Hurricane Betsy in 1965. In 1947, floods inundated southwest Louisiana and a hurricane 
struck near New Orleans. The Guard response was robust in each case, but remained similar to 
traditional actions, such as waterborne rescue, evacuation support, and security from looting.90 In 
1948, the Mississippi River levee burst at Port Allen, creating a major flood disaster. The area 
deluged was sparsely populated but the Guard response was quick and effective. The 769th Anti-
Aircraft Battalion used DUKWs and high water trucks to rescue three hundred people who were 
in harm’s way. Six Army and Air Guard units immediately assisted with aerial reconnaissance, 
sandbagging efforts, communications, and the transportation and distribution of meals to 
evacuees and relief laborers. The coordination between different types of units is notable in the 
reports, as are the communications used.  
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In 1949, General Hufft broadened the Guard’s emergency role when he ordered Guard 
units to help with drought relief in St. Bernard, Plaquemines, and Jefferson parishes. Guard tank 
trucks delivered over 250,000 gallons of potable water to citizens until sufficient rainfall ended 
the drought. In 1950, Hufft sent members of his staff to the scenes of disasters elsewhere in the 
United States to study and report on the successes and failures of others in emergency response. 
The resulting state disaster plan was one of the more comprehensive in the U.S. at the time. 
Liaisons and/or close communications were set up with state agencies, parish governments, the 
Coast Guard, and the Red Cross. In addition to “Operation Drink” (above), 1950 saw the Guard 
evacuate 2,700 people from river floods in central Louisiana and assist the Red Cross with 
tornado victims across communities in Northwest Louisiana. When a hurricane again threatened 
Southeast Louisiana, Hufft’s civilian “ham” radio network aided the Adjutant General’s Office 
in getting accurate information and filtering out “wild rumors of loss of life and destruction of 
property.” This short lived civil defense initiative was helpful after all.91 
When Fleming returned to Louisiana in 1952, he continued and expanded on Hufft’s 
disaster plans. Coordination and communication, both internally and with all state and federal 
agencies, was further solidified. The next year, heavy rains produced more flooding in central 
and southwest Louisiana. The Louisiana Army National Guard assisted the Coast Guard with the 
evacuation of 8,900 people in 25 parishes.  When Hurricane Flossie hit in 1956, the Guard took 
similar actions, but engineering operations were added as Guard cranes removed boats and large 
debris from roadways in the aftermath of the storm.92 
                                                          
91 State of Louisiana Adjutant General’s Office press releases, 23 July 1951, LANG Archives. 
92 Biennial Reports, 1952-1953. Adjutant General Reports Collection, LANG Archives. 
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In 1957, Hurricane Audrey hit the state. Louisiana’s first storm to have its name “retired” 
by the National Weather Service, it was the first truly horrific emergency of this time period. 
Others resulted in damaged property and occasional loss of life, but Audrey completely 
devastated Cameron and Vermillion parishes. It brought about one of the largest death tolls prior 
to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The storm covered coastal portions of those parishes with water 
and shut down communication infrastructure there. Guard aerial reconnaissance was the only 
way to immediately survey the destruction. National Guard vehicles quickly transported doctors, 
nurses, medical supplies and food as close to the flooded areas as they could. DUKWs went out 
into the floodwaters to pluck survivors from trees, rooftops, and floating debris. Perhaps the most 
gruesome expansion of responsibilities involved the collection of decomposing bodies and 
transportation to an icehouse that was acting as a temporary morgue. While this response 
involved the usual coordination with state agencies and the Coast Guard, the severity of Audrey 
also brought cooperation with the regular Armed Forces, including the Army and Air Force.93  
Works based on civilian oral histories and memoirs recall caravans of DUKWs and 
helicopter rescues. The National Guard cordoned off the hardest hit areas until debris clearing 
and body recovery could take place. Rushing storm victims to hospitals and makeshift medical 
facilities was another aspect of civil defense and military units. According to Cameron Parish 
resident, Cathy C. Post, “Diesel fumes from the army vehicles filled the air.” 94 Another civilian 
account recalls military helicopters working day and night to aid survivors. Waters were moving 
so swift around Arvin Primeaux’s rooftop sanctuary, DUKWs had a difficult time rescuing him, 
but eventually did.95  Among other shelters, such as McNeese Cowboys stadium and Chennault 
                                                          
93 Biennial Reports, 1956-1957, Adjutant General Reports Collection, LANG Archives. 
94 Cathy C. Post, Hurricane Audrey:  The Deadly Storm of 1957 (Gretna: Pelican Publishing 2007), 213-244. 
95 Susan McFillen Goodson and Nola Mae Wittler Ross, Hurricane Audrey (Sulphur: Wise Publications 1996), 94-
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Air Force base, the armory headquarters of the Louisiana Guard’s 3-156th Infantry Battalion 
housed thousands of storm victims.96 In 1961, the lessons of Audrey led to Louisiana’s largest 
evacuation of coastal territories up to that time. The National Guard assisted the LCDA and other 
state agencies in evacuating an estimated 50,000 to 80,000 residents before Hurricane Carla 
struck the area.97 
Louisiana disasters were not just of the natural variety. The National Guard responded to 
multiple industrial accidents between 1946 and 1965. In 1954, a gas well explosion in St. Martin 
Parish resulted in unsafe conditions around the site. Area units assisted local law enforcement in 
cordoning off the zone.  In 1957, an oil refinery fire in Meraux created a hazard for the residents 
of the area. Heavy rains turned the ground into thick, sludgy mud, complicating the situation. 
Guardsmen from Jackson Barracks not only cordoned off the area and helped with firefighting, 
but the military jeeps proved effective in the transportation of foamite from trucks on nearby 
roads to the immediate refinery site. Engineering operations were brought in as Guard bulldozers 
created a dam to trap the leaking gasoline and prevented the fire from spreading. Helicopters 
were used to transport fire-fighting equipment and foamite from the airport to St. Bernard 
Parish.98 By the mid-sixties, the Louisiana National Guard’s experience with disasters was broad. 
In 1964, the aging Ray Fleming retired from the adjutant general position for the third 
and final time, and Governor John McKeithen passed over Hufft for a former Army Reserve 
commander from southwest Louisiana, Major General Erbon Wise. Most of the Guard command 
                                                          
96 Donald Menard, The Untold Story of Hurricane Audrey (Lafayette: Acadiana Publishing, 2007), 18. 
97 Hurricane Carla: Sept 3-14, 1961. Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, Region 5, Denton TX 
(Washington DC: US Government Printing Offices, 1961), 9.  
98 Biennial Reports 1956-57, Adjutant General Reports collection, LANG Archives. Foamite is a preparation 
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staff and leadership remained the same, however, as did the personnel in the Louisiana Civil 
Defense Agency. The emergency systems and procedures established by Fleming and Hufft 
remained in place. In the years leading up to the onslaught of Hurricane Betsy, the Louisiana 
National Guard had established itself as the main line of first response, supplemented by the 
Coast Guard, assisting state agencies, and the Red Cross. When Hurricane Betsy struck on 
September 9, 1965, it proved to be “The Big One” as heavily populated areas near and inside 
New Orleans found themselves in its path. The storm surge over-topped levees, flooding most of 
Plaquemines and St. Bernard Parishes. The densely populated Ninth Ward of New Orleans 
flooded as well.  Baton Rouge and parts of Acadiana were also affected. Betsy was the worst 
storm to hit Southeast Louisiana since 1915. It killed 81 people, injured over 17,600, and left 
250,000 homeless.99 The first storm to cause over a $1,000,000,000 in damages, it was 
nicknamed “Billion Dollar Betsy.”100 The activation called up about 3,200 Guardsmen, making it 
the largest up to its time. It encompassed thirty five of the state’s sixty four parishes.101 
The Adjutant General’s staff set up an Emergency Operations Center at State 
Headquarters in Jackson Barracks. Betsy’s fast and erratic movement created some confusion, 
but trucks and DUKWs were sent into the nearby New Orleans and St. Bernard Parish 
neighborhoods as well as into Plaquemines Parish. Rescue operations began immediately. Guard 
vehicles brought survivors to the St. Claude Avenue Bridge where they were subsequently 
                                                          
99 Senate Report 109-322, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, Special Report of the Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 77. 
100 http://www.hurricanescience.org/history/storms/1960s/betsy/ (accessed August 28, 2015). 
101 Report on Hurricane Betsy, 8-11 September, 1965. US Army Corps of Engineers, New    
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 37 
 
moved again to public buildings in the city. Other inundated areas requiring search and rescue 
were Gentilly and New Orleans East.102  
Missions varied widely for the Guard during Hurricane Betsy. Security operations 
included support of New Orleans Police Department as businesses and homes were being looted 
in the drier parts of town. Guard duty at shelters was also considered necessary as fears of civil 
unrest abounded. Two hundred Guardsmen provided security at a large consolidated refugee 
center in Algiers. Military police waded in chest high water in some cases to direct the traffic of 
rescue vehicles. Commodity distribution played a greater role than it ever had before. 
Guardsmen hauled food, clothing, and ice into the affected area from North Louisiana. In 
addition to water and food rations, units provided portable bathing capability, electric generators, 
and set up field kitchens for civilians and soldiers alike.103 Medical missions increased as medics 
provided immunizations and first aid for storm victims and incoming soldiers. Hay was 
transported to stranded cattle and horses in rural areas.104 Many Guardsmen from the New 
Orleans metropolitan area suffered considerable personal loss in the event, yet remained on duty 
for the duration of the activation.105 
Despite a full activation of units in the Southern portion of the state, New Orleans 
required extra help. 4th Battalion of the 156th Infantry Regiment came all the way down from the 
Shreveport area for storm duty. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ansel Stroud, it provided 
help to some of the hardest hit sections of the city. One of its more unpleasant duties entailed 
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animal control operations. Some neighborhoods were over run by snakes, rats, and feral dogs. 
The soldiers cleared those zones as tasked.106 Units from around the state moved five thousand 
refugees from City Hall to the Municipal Auditorium which had more room and was easier to 
manage. Jackson Barracks itself was partially flooded by Betsy. Areas closer to the Mississippi 
River stayed dry while other parts of post got up to four feet of water. Residents of the Ninth 
Ward, Arabi, and Chalmette were evacuated to the dry area of the Barracks and subsequently to 
other public buildings and shelters.107  
The Guard collaborated with a wide array of other organizations due to the scope of the 
disaster. State Headquarters maintained contact with the governor’s office, 4th Army 
Headquarters, and the federal Office of Emergency Preparedness, in addition to the state and 
parish civil defense agencies. Requests were made to other states and to the regular Armed 
Forces for helicopters and pilots to assist rescue operations. Louisiana’s 39th Aviation Battalion 
had limited resources to effect search and rescue on its own. Guard helicopters were used 
primarily for transportation, reconnaissance, and communications. An emergency heliport was 
established inside Jackson Barracks, near the levee. Colonel Numa Avendano, former 
commander of the Washington Artillery, coordinated the Louisiana Civil Defense Agency with 
the National Guard, the federal Office of Emergency Preparedness and other agencies. The 
Guard partnered with The Salvation Army and The Urban League for commodity distribution in 
New Orleans. The Louisiana Guard also worked with the 4th Army, based out of Fort Polk, 
                                                          
106 Major General (Retired) Ansel M. Stroud, Jr. interviewed by Major Maria LoVasco, October 16, 1997, DVD and 
video collection, LANG Archives. 
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Louisiana. 4th Army units administered refugee shelters and assisted with commodity distribution 
for almost 2 weeks in multiple parishes.108 
In some cases, local governments proved uncooperative with each other or the federal 
government, causing the Louisiana Guard to intervene. In Grand Isle, for example, municipal 
and parish officials bickered with each other about responsibilities, causing delays in aid to 
residents. The Guard ultimately took care of commodity distribution there and helped with 
evacuation and shelter. Another complication was the notorious leader of Plaquemines Parish.  
Leander Perez would not accept direct aid from the federal government. He was a strident 
advocate for “local rule” and a harsh opponent of the federal government’s recent efforts at racial 
integration. Regardless of his ideology, parish residents needed assistance. Federal agencies 
relied solely on the Louisiana Guard to evacuate the victims in Plaquemines. This “compromise” 
was acceptable to Perez because the Guard activation was under the command of Governor 
McKeithen and not any federal entity.109 Lower Plaquemines was so affected that it was 
temporarily sealed off. Guardsmen blockaded roads entering the area until debris clearing and 
other recovery operations could take place.110 Similar to 4th Battalion in New Orleans, 1st 
Battalion of the 156th Infantry Regiment had the heartbreaking task of capturing starving and 
aggressive dogs in Venice, Louisiana. Most were sick from drinking salt water and had to be 
euthanized. Lieutenant Roy Bailey managed to save and adopt a female Sheppard mix, naming 
her “Betsy.”111  
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The Guard was active in other parts of Louisiana for Betsy. Company C of the 769th 
Signal Battalion performed constant operations for eleven days in Lafourche Parish. The 119 
man unit rotated shifts for various jobs including clearing roads, removing debris, directing 
traffic, distributing ice and providing security from potential looters.112 Units performed missions 
in Houma and Donaldsonville as well. Near Baton Rouge, Betsy’s wrath included industrial 
accident response as a chlorine barge sank, creating a potential chemical event, hazardous to the 
nearby population.113 LANG supplied six hundred soldiers with personnel transport vehicles in 
case a speedy evacuation was necessary.114 Company A of the 769th reported to Morganza as 
ruptured gas lines created a fire and explosion hazard. They supported utility crews in shutting 
down the gas mains and in keeping civilians clear of the danger areas.115 
Even the former commanders of the earlier Cold War period did not miss out on Betsy’s 
action.  The retired Fleming, now 76 years old, was allowed residency at Jackson Barracks. He 
and his wife were evacuated from the facility by Guard forces during the response.  General 
Hufft, appointed regional customs collector by President Kennedy in 1962, communicated with 
the state Guard headquarters during Betsy. The Daily Staff Journal maintained during the 
activation mentions his name several times but does not indicate specifics about his involvement. 
It is unsurprisingly, however, that the relatively young Hufft would want a “piece of the action” 
during such a dramatic response operation.116  
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The official activation period for Betsy was from Thursday September 9 to Tuesday 
September 21. Round the clock operations occurred during that window of operation.117 The 
National Guard and other first responders were praised by most officials following the Betsy 
response. When visiting New Orleans in the aftermath, President Lyndon Johnson explicitly 
commended the local first response efforts.118  Several letters to General Wise from various 
officials and local business owners in southeastern Louisiana showed appreciation of LANG 
actions.  There was, however, some criticism. Dr. Edward Teller, a prominent nuclear physicist 
and government advisor, criticized the response as confused and ineffective. His criticism was 
based largely on the premise of civil defense abstractions. The failure of state and local 
authorities to evacuate the area before Betsy’s landfall was a bad indicator of what would happen 
in case of a nuclear attack.  Perhaps more grounded in the immediate needs of his constituents 
and having actively participated in first response efforts, New Orleans Mayor Victor Schiro 
characterized Teller’s statements as “ridiculous and irresponsible.”119  US Army documents and 
the Louisiana National Guard’s own after action reports included more practical criticism. One 
of the main complaints was a dearth of effective communication. While this was somewhat true 
of internal communications, the problem was particularly bad for inter-agency coordination 
during the event. Most, however, came to the conclusion that without the Guard and other 
agencies’ quick response efforts, Betsy’s impact would have been much worse.120 
A later twentieth century government study came to a specific set of conclusions about 
the use of National Guard forces in emergency response. Civilian volunteers are often very 
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helpful but one cannot always rely on them to put thoughts about their own property and families 
aside. Guardsmen are trained to be organized and disciplined. Their training for combat gives 
them an edge up on most civilians in terms of maintaining command and control during 
prolonged periods of intense stress and disorder. Members are conditioned to endure discomfort 
and dangerous conditions. Guard equipment, such as the amphibious vehicles, 2 1/2 ton trucks, 
helicopters, and rugged terrain vehicles, can serve in an emergency response role as well as 
traditional military ones.  They can put forward a show of force to dissuade potential looters or 
those who may otherwise take advantage of chaotic situations.  Some would also say that state 
military organizations also embody a certain symbolism that can be seen in a hard or soft light, 
as helpers to those in need and also as a force to maintain order. While the latter role can be 
manifested in negative ways, most citizens have a sense of relief when seeing a military presence 
during a crisis situation. With or without symbolism, the practical aspects of using military 
personnel and resources in an emergency situation become obvious as they are applied.121 A 
National Guard commander from a later period summarized the point: 
If I tell my troops to go out and secure an area, prevent looting, clean the streets 
of debris and provide people with shelter, food, and water, I only have to give that 
order once, even if the conditions are miserable. No one will say they don’t want 
to do it because it is unsafe, raining, dark, cold, too difficult, or will take more 
than eight hours to accomplish.122  
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One should not downplay the sacrifices of Red Cross workers, local law enforcement, or citizen 
volunteers, but the commander does make a valid point.   
Why entrust the National Guard with civil defense or emergency response missions 
instead of a federal force or the regular Army? Community based units and their headquarters are 
prepositioned all over the state, with resources on hand. Through liaison and shared experience, 
commanders are often familiar with their counterparts in local government and other state 
agencies.123  
 
Hurricane Betsy Activation. Courtesy Louisiana National Guard Archives 
                                                          
123 Benet D. Gellman, “Planning for a National Nuclear Emergency: The Organization of Government and Federal-
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The perceived threat of war with the Soviet Union gave the United States defense 
establishment a perfect foil to improve overall readiness. Improvements in training and 
organization, combined with the preparation for a defense of the homeland, created the tools, 
skills, and readiness that the Louisiana National Guard would need in the eventuality of a major 
disaster. As the early Cold War period progressed, the emphasis changed from preparedness for a 
nuclear attack to the more practical concern of disaster response. As it turned out, Betsy was 
more of an immediate danger than Nikita Khrushchev or Fidel Castro. 
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Conclusion 
The three roles of the Louisiana National Guard during the early Cold War interacted and 
affected each other despite their differences. While federal expansion of the Guard and 
mandatory improvements in training were not intended to affect civil defense or emergency 
response roles, they improved readiness in those areas regardless. The Guard, on a national level, 
had uneven improvement in federal mobilization readiness throughout the fifties and sixties. The 
Louisiana National Guard, however, seems to have progressed more evenly in comparison to the 
national average as seen through the high marks given to Louisiana units during the Berlin 
Crisis. Similarly, 1955’s Operation Minuteman was a success in the state for civil defense 
purposes. The LANG’s commanders, Ray Fleming and Ray Hufft, effectively managed federal 
and state resources to improve the professionalism and readiness of the Guard throughout the 
period.  
Federal mandates increased manpower and made training practices more efficient and 
effective. Civil defense initiatives improved the Louisiana National Guard’s interoperability 
within its own ranks as well as with other agencies in the case of a domestic emergency. Military 
and civil defense training and policy created diverse units that could activate with speed and 
operate well with each other and with other agencies and organizations. As a series of natural 
and manmade disasters hit Louisiana from 1946 to 1965, these skills were applied to those 
immediate threats. Major General Ansel M. Stroud, Jr was the commander of the 4-156th Infantry 
during Betsy and later became adjutant general of the LANG. He remarked in a 1997 interview 
that he and the Guard learned a lot about response for a major emergency in that summer of 
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1965. The lessons learned from the previous decades of training and other disasters were applied 
to deal with Hurricane Betsy.124  
Louisiana National Guard disaster response operations continue to evolve. After the 
series of disasters in the 1950s and 1960s, major emergencies became more isolated until the 
twin impact of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 made even Betsy seem mild. In a similar 
vein, traditional military activity ramped up again as a result of the multi-front Global War on 
Terror. This time, however, the National Guard became an operational force in overseas combat, 
with units constantly deployed overseas from 2002 through 2015. After the 9/11/2001 terror 
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, civil defense 
agencies again became a major part of federal, state, and local government. In the 21st century, 
“Homeland Security” became the accepted term, but these agencies and efforts retained many of 
the elements developed by the civil defense initiatives of the Cold War. Emergency response 
activations for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were quickly followed by Hurricanes Gustav, Ike, 
and Isaac as well as a river flood emergency and a disastrous oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Once again, war service, civil defense, and disaster response missions overlapped. The Cold War 
evolution of these different, but related, functions of the National Guard led to continued 
development in all categories.  
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